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The Convention on the Future of Europe: Extended Working Group or 
Constitutional Assembly? 
 





“We are a Convention. We are not an Intergovernmental Conference because we 
have not been given a mandate by Governments to negotiate on their behalf the 
solutions which we propose. We are not a Parliament because we are not elected 
by citizens to draft legislative texts. […] We are a Convention. What does this 
mean? A Convention is a group of men and women meeting for the sole purpose 
of preparing a joint proposal. […] It is a task modest in form but immense in 
content, for if it succeeds in accordance with our mandate, it will light up the future 
of Europe”.1 
In his speech inaugurating the Convention process on 26 February 2002 in 
Brussels, Convention President VALÉRY  GISCARD D’ESTAING raises three 
issues: first, he refers to the Convention’s nature and method; second, he 
talks of the Convention’s aim and output; and, third, he evokes the 
Convention’s historic and symbolic significance. All three aspects have been 
amply discussed in the past two years by politicians and academics analysing 
whether the Convention’s purpose and instruments differ fundamentally from 
those of previous reform rounds; whether the input into and output of the 
Convention process qualitatively improves European Treaty revision; and 
whether the Convention as an institution lived up to its symbolic and 
                                                           
1 V. GISCARD D’ESTAING, Introductory Speech by President Giscard d’Estaing to the Convention on the 
Future of Europe, SN 1565/02, Brussels, 2002.   3
normative load, reflected in comparisons with “Philadelphia” or references to a 
“constitutional moment”.
2 
Albeit acknowledging the intricate link between the Convention’s method, 
output and symbolism, we are particularly interested in the process  of 
constitution-making, in “constitutional politics” as “creating and modifying EU 
fundamental and/or foundational rules and institutions”.
3 More specifically, 
looking back after the Convention submitted its Draft Constitutional Treaty and 
the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) to follow was successfully 
concluded, we aim to assess the nature and institutional quality of the 
Convention as the latest innovation in EU Treaty reform, revisiting analogies 
(often all too easily) drawn at the beginning of the Convention process and 
reaching from “a second Philadelphia” to a “hidden IGC”. We will thus tackle 
Giscard’s question - what does it mean to be a Convention? - drawing on 
several of the qualifying cues provided in the above-quoted speech: the 
nature of the Convention’s mandate, its relationship with the subsequent 
governmental negotiations and the mode of (s)electing its delegates. 
A first, theoretical part will consider the method of constitutional politics in a 
wider theoretical context, linking ontological and normative assumptions about 
the European integration process with possible assessments of the most 
appropriate and legitimate mode of Treaty reform and constitutional change. 
We will then define the two comparative categories used to assess the 
Convention’s nature and institutional quality - “working group” and 
                                                           
2 L. HOFFMANN, “The Convention on the Future of Europe: Thoughts on the Convention Model”, Jean 
Monnet Working Paper 11/2002. Available at 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/02/021101.pdf; CH. REH and W. WESSELS, “Towards an 
Innovative Mode of Treaty Reform? Three Sets of Expectations for the Convention” in Collegium 24, 
2002, pp.17-42; L. HOFFMANN and A. VERGÉS-BAUSILI, “The Reform of Treaty Revision Procedures: 
The European Convention on the Future of Europe” in T.A. BÖRZEL and R.A. CICHOWSKY (eds.), The 
State of the European Union Volume IV: Law, Politics and Society, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2003, pp.127-146; J. JARLEBRING, “Tacking Stock of the Convention: What Added Value Does the 
Convention Bring to the Process of Treaty Revision?” in German Law Journal, 4:8, 2003, pp.785-
799; P.  MAGNETTE, “Coping with Constitutional Incompatibilities: Bargains and Rhetoric in the 
Convention on the Future of Europe”, Jean Monnet Working Paper 14/2003. Available at 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/03/031401.pdf; J. SHAW, “Postnational Constitutionalism 
in the European Union” in Journal of European Public Policy, 6:4, 1999, pp.579-597; J.E. FOSSUM 
and AUGUSTÍN  MENÉNDEZ, “The Constitution’s Gift: A Deliberative Democratic Analysis of 
Constitution-Making in the European Union”, Paper presented at the 2004 Maastricht Forum on 
European Integration, 19 November 2004, Maastricht; A.  MAURER and D.  GÖLER, “Die 




3 C.  CLOSA, “Improving EU Constitutional Politics? A Preliminary Assessment of the Convention”, 
Constitutionalism Web-Papers, Con-Web 1/2003, p.1. Available at http://lles1.man.ac.uk/conweb/.   4
“constitutional assembly” - embed them in their historical context, their use in 
the political praxis and the kind of associations they trigger. The empirical 
analysis to follow will draw on six “constitutive steps” discussed by JON 
ELSTER as definitive of a constitutional assembly.
4 We will then build on and 
specify ELSTER’s steps - including convocation, selection of delegates, official 
mandate, formal constitution and delegates’ credentials, procedural rules and 
ratification - to develop a set of criteria, that allows us to delimit the features 
characteristic of a working group as distinct from those characterising a 
constitutional assembly. In order to understand more fully what happened 
between February 2002 and June 2004, these criteria will be systematically 
checked against the Convention process and the IGC that followed with 
regard to, first, the underlying political rationale, second, the Convention’s 
working methods, and, third, its substantive constitutional output. 
A similar procedure, we argue, allows a fuller analysis of the much-quoted 
“Convention method” than has hitherto been attempted, and thus permits to 
tackle a question at the heart of the current reform round: does the 
Convention resemble a genuine constitutional assembly more than a mere 
preparatory group or has the EU - once again - developed a sui generis mode 
of building and changing its Constitution? Put differently, does the Convention 
process present us with a “qualitative leap” in the method and output of 
European reform or are we looking at one more, yet by no means final, step in 
Europe’s long-term and incremental process of constitutionalisation? 
 
I  Theorising and Contextualising the Convention Method 
 
A.  The Method of Constitutional Politics and the Ontology of 
Integration 
 
Any attempt to answer the above question by assessing the Convention’s 
nature and by categorising its defining characteristics has wider implications: 
different normative expectations (both hopes and fears) about the 
Convention’s place in the European integration process inevitably stem from 
                                                           
4 J. ELSTER, “Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constitutional Assemblies” in University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of Constitutional Law 2, 2000. No page numbers.   5
different underlying theoretical and normative assumptions about the nature of 
the Union itself. With the Convention’s categorisation thus inextricably linked 
to issues of political power and legitimacy, the method of constitutional politics 
chosen will depend upon what is defined as the object of change: are we 
reforming the Treaties of an essentially international (and thus 
intergovernmental) entity, or are we amending (and building) the Constitution 
of a Union that is becoming increasingly “statal”? 
Indeed, the conclusions drawn in the academic debate about Europe’s 
“ontological conundrum”
5 not only impact on what is normatively required from 
the polity’s political and institutional set-up, but also influence how the political 
praxis of reforming its fundamental rules and institutions is assessed. This 
problématique is not as novel as may seem: in the early days of European 
integration already, discussions centred around the type of integration as well 
as around the method of political change. Instead of proceeding through 
“normal diplomatic channels” European Union was to be brought about by the 
population, propagated ALTIERO SPINELLI, a leading Federalist, and called for 
an elected constituent assembly to prepare a Constitution that would then be 
submitted to national parliaments.
6 
In reality, as is well-known, European Union has been brought about - and 
reformed - along a different route. Indeed, the “first debate” in integration 
theory dealt mainly with the “nature of the beast”
7 and, albeit providing very 
different answers regarding the political and institutional forces driving the 
process, both intergovernmentalism
8 and neo-functionalism
9 sit well with what 
has become known as the “IGC mode” of reform. Anchoring the Union firmly 
in the realm of the international with Member States remaining the “Masters of 
the Treaties” and legitimacy indirectly stemming from elected national 
governments, intergovernmentalists could subscribe to an IGC’s institutional 
                                                           
5 D.N. CHRYSSOCHOOU, Theorizing European Integration, London, Sage, 2001, p.2. 
6 A. SPINELLI, “The Growth of the European Movement Since the Second World War” in M. Hodges 
(ed.), European Integration: Selected Readings, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1972 [1957], pp.43-68 at 
p.62. 
7 T H.  RISSE-KAPPEN, “Exploring the Nature of the Beast: International Relations Theory and 
Comparative Policy Analysis Meet the European Union” in Journal of Common Market Studies, 34, 
1, 1996, pp.53-80 at p.53. 
8 S.  HOFFMANN, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation State and the Case of Western 
Europe” in Daedalus, 95, 3, 1966, pp.862-915. 
9 E.B.  HAAS,  The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957, London, 
Stevens, 1957.   6
set-up - with the European Council as ultimate authority, the Commission as 
an “honest broker” and a working group style of preparation and pre-
negotiation allowing for limited public and parliamentary input.
10 Neo-
functionalists, on the contrary, focusing analytically on transnational problem-
solving and supranational entrepreneurship, as well as on legitimacy flowing 
from effective policy outputs and a shift of loyalties to the new centre, might 
not consider the IGC mode the most institutionally appropriate, yet have seen 
their substantive predictions confirmed in the incremental growth of 
supranational competences at various IGCs. 
With deepening legal and political integration - and the Maastricht 
ratification crisis in particular - the academic discourse on the nature of the 
Union began to change, paralleled by an increasing dissatisfaction with the 
established praxis of Treaty reform. Political scientists studied the EU less as 
an international entity catering for restricted functional needs: on the one 
hand, the European Union was seen as a political instance sui generis, a 
system of “multi-level governance” escaping traditional analytic categories,
11 
while, on the other hand, the “comparative politics turn” approached the 
Union, via statal categories, as a “political system”.
12 Legal scholars agreed 
that the European order had evolved from international law - creating 
relationships between states - into a “constitutionally and institutionally 
sophisticated”
13 legal system that confers rights and obligations on citizens 
and private parties and restrains public power in a way that is similar to a 
nation state.
14 At the same time, it was vividly debated whether the Union 
                                                           
10 A. MORAVCSIK, “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist 
Approach” in Journal of Common Market Studies, 31, 4, 1993, pp.473-523; A. MORAVCSIK and N. 
KALYPSO, “Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, Influence, Institutions” in Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 37, 1, 1999, pp.59-86. 
11 G. MARKS et al., “European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multi-Level Governance” in 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 34, 3, 1996, pp.341-378; M. JACHTENFUCHS and B. KOHLER-
KOCH, “Regieren und Institutionenbildung” in M.  JACHTENFUCHS and B.  KOHLER-KOCH (eds.), 
Europäische Integration, Opladen, Leske + Budrich, 2003, pp.11-46. 
12   S. HIX, The Political System of the European Union, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999. 
13 S.  WEATHERILL, “Is Constitutional Finality Feasible or Desirable? On the Cases for European 
Constitutionalism and a European Constitution”, Constitutionalism Web-Papers, Con-Web, 7/2002, 
p.4. Available at http://lles1.man.ac.uk/conweb/. 
14   P. CRAIG, “Constitution, Constitutionalism, and the European Union” in European Law Journal, 7, 2, 
2001, pp.125-150 at p.126.   7
already has or should have a Constitution
15 and what exactly are the 
particularities of Europe’s “multi-level”, “post-national” or “plural” 
constitutionalism.
16 In political praxis too, almost 50 years after SPINELLI’s call 
for a European constituent assembly, JOSCHKA FISCHER’s Humboldt Speech of 
May 2000 eventually brought constitutional finalité back onto the agenda. 
This link between changing assumptions about the Union’s nature and a 
more critical assessment of the reform praxis can hardly surprise: if we are 
essentially dealing with constitutional change rather than with Treaty reform, 
the classic way of piecemeal engineering, combining closed negotiations on 
the technical and ministerial level with attention-catching final summits
17, may 
indeed seem problematic with regard to both process and outcome. The 2000 
Nice Summit in particular brought the pitfalls of Intergovernmental 
Conferences to light, sparking wide-ranging criticism of the un-transparent 
and opaque nature of their preparation and negotiation. 
It was against this background that the Convention on the Future of Europe 
was set up - at the intersection of divergent (academic) views about the 
nature of European integration as well as different (political) positions on the 
most legitimate way to reform the Union. Accordingly, any attempt at labelling 
or categorising the Convention should lay open its theoretical “baggage” and 
admit to subscribing - if only implicitly - to a particular stand on the nature of 
the Union’s legal system and the process of integration. 
 
B.  The Comparative Categories in Their Political and Historical 
Context 
 
When we use established terms in attempts to heuristically grasp hitherto 
unknown phenomena we engage in an exercise beyond denoting and 
                                                           
15 J.-C. PIRIS, “Does the European Union Have a Constitution? Does It Need One?”, Jean Monnet 
Working Paper, 05/2000. Available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/00/000501.rtf; 
J.H.H. WEILER, “In Defence of the Status Quo: Europe’s Constitutional Sonderweg” in J.H.H. WEILER 
and M.  WIND (eds.), European Constitutionalism Beyond the State, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2003, pp.7-23. 
16 I. PERNICE, “Multilevel Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: European Constitution-Making 
Revisited?” in Common Market Law Review, 36, 1999, pp.703-750; J. SHAW, supra footnote 3; N. 
WALKER, “The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism” in Modern Law Review, 65, 2002, pp.317-359. 
17 M.  GRAY, “Negotiating EU Treaties: The Case for a New Approach” in E.  BEST et al. (eds.), 
Rethinking the European Union: IGC 2000 and Beyond, Maastricht, EIPA, 2000, pp.263-280 at 
pp.267 et seq.   8
naming. Given that a political concept cannot be separated from its use in the 
political praxis,
18 by assigning a “label” to a novel facet of social reality, we 
simultaneously suggest a specific context and tradition, thus calling into play a 
range of associations and connotations, as well as normative expectations. 
This certainly holds true for the two concepts guiding our empirical analysis, 
namely working group “versus” constitutional assembly, each of which carries 
very particular and partially contradictory associations and expectations. 
In the following, we will define a working group according to its function and 
output-based legitimacy, rather than its composition. A working group, usually 
a relatively small-scale body, will be established to fulfil a specific and clearly 
defined task, which frequently includes the preparation and pre-negotiation of 
decisions to be taken at a higher political level. This, in turn, implies that for 
ultimate decision-making a working group depends on a “principal”, which has 
set it up as an “agent”, and that the group’s power, influence and legitimacy 
flow from knowledge and expertise rather than from its representativity or 
accountability. Furthermore, a working group will always operate in a clearly 
delimited and pre-structured context, does not create a political space, and 
moreover its style of interaction within this context is expected to follow a logic 
of problem-solving.
19 
Yet, when looking at the reality of both Community decision-making and 
constitutional politics, we quickly realise that a plethora of heterogeneous 
empirical examples may be associated with the “working group category”. A 
classic example from EC decision-making is the group of national civil 
servants, which pre-negotiates the technical details of EU legislation before 
passing its results on to the Committee of Permanent Representatives 
(COREPER) and ultimately to the Council of Ministers. Here, expectations 
revolve around technical expertise, efficient problem-solving and a 
deliberative decision-style.
20 
When it comes to European constitutional politics, examples can be drawn 
from both preparation phases prior to and decision-making processes during 
                                                           
18 Q. SKINNER, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas” in History and Theory, 8, 1969, 
pp.3-53. 
19 O.  ELGSTRÖM and CH.  JÖNSSON, “Negotiation in the European Union: Bargaining or Problem-
Solving?” in Journal of European Public Policy, 7, 5, 2000, pp.684-704.   9
Intergovernmental Conferences. Thus, although national governments have 
traditionally retained a substantial share of agenda-setting and preparation for 
themselves, more often than not in the history of EU reform the choice of 
issues, the definition of problems and the generation of alternative solutions 
have been delegated to groups or committees. Set up as pre-IGC “think 
tanks” these varied in political weight but have always bundled expertise and 
floated ideas. Including the Spaak, the Dooge or the Delors committees 
(preparing Rome, the Single European Act and Maastricht respectively) and 
groups providing reports such as the “Reflection Group” (Amsterdam) or the 
“Group of Wise Men” (Nice) they have operated with different degrees of 
impact and success, yet with a clear purpose: to pin down the problems to be 
solved, to define them and to propose a set of solutions.
21 Similarly, once the 
IGCs of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice had been launched, a substantial 
element of the negotiations was delegated to the - relatively unknown - 
“Group of Government Representatives” which pre-negotiated all issues 
under discussion at the bureaucratic and technical level and which, in view of 
both its function and composition, was a working group in all but name. 
Contrary to these examples, all taken from the process of European 
integration, when illustrating constitutional assemblies we refer to historical 
cases of nation state building. Labelling the European Convention as a 
constitutional assembly thus also implies going beyond the classic 
differentiation between the nation state and the evolving European construct. 
We do not seek to repeat the detailed account of historical constitutional 
conventions provided earlier in this volume
22 or to challenge the conclusion 
that such bodies are a rather uncommon feature of national constitution 
making in Europe. Nonetheless, the classical cases of constitution building by 
such assemblies - the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 in the United States or 
the  Assemblée Constituante of 1789 to 1791 in France - have served as 
reference points for debates on the quality of the European Convention, as 
Convention President GISCARD underlined from the start. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
20 J.  LEWIS, “The Methods of Community in EU Decision-Making and Administrative Rivalry in the 
Council’s Infrastructure” in Journal of European Public Policy, 7, 2, 2000, pp.261-289. 
21  Contrary to the above definition of working groups, these committees had very comprehensive 
mandates, with free thinking rather called for than prevented. Nevertheless, in all cases any real 
impact of the results depended upon re-opening or approval by the Heads of State and Government.   10
Following DIPPEL’s synthesis, we can define a constitutional assembly 
broadly as “an elected body acting under the commission of and beside an 
existing legislative body for the sole and express purpose of drafting or 
revising a constitution afterwards to be presented to the people for their 
approval or rejection”.
23 The problems of linking this definition too closely to 
the term convention become obvious when looking at two more recent cases 
in Europe. The “Constitutional Convention of Herrenchiemsee” was a 
committee of experts preparing a first draft of the Western German 
Grundgesetz, which was then delivered to the so-called “Parliamentary 
Council” before being ratified. The Convention that prepared the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, on the other hand, by no means 
drafted a complete new constitutional text nor did it act under the commission 
of an existing legislative body. In brief, trying to subsume a wealth of historical 
cases within one definition risks that our comparisons and conclusions 
become overly general. 
In the following, we therefore propose to set aside the historically loaded 
term convention and to instead use the two dichotomous categories of 
working group and constitutional assembly as heuristic tools for our empirical 
analysis. In view of the breadth and complexity of European Treaty reform, as 
well as the historical associations, the two categories will be broken down into 
a set of refined criteria, allowing a systematic assessment of the European 
Convention’s nature and institutional quality, rather than a broad-brushed 
opposition of the “Convention method” and the “IGC mode”. In the following 
sub-section a similar set is elaborated to serve as a conceptual foil for the 
empirical analysis, which will discuss whether the European Convention was 
a genuinely novel form of constitutionalising the EU and how far it remained 
an integral part of previous reform processes. 
 
C.  Six Constitutive Steps: Criteria to Analyse the European 
Convention 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
22 H. DIPPEL, “Conventions in Comparative Constitutional Law” in D. HANF (ed.). 
23 H. DIPPEL, supra note 23.   11
For our empirical analysis, we will follow JON ELSTER who, drawing on the 
classic cases of constitution making in the US and France, proposes that the 
above-mentioned six “constitutive steps” are characteristic of a constitutional 
assembly in general terms.
24 In the following, we will briefly outline these 
steps and highlight the differences in view of the above-defined working group 
and constitutional assembly, before moving on to apply the derived criteria to 





In characterising the “convocation-phase” ELSTER begins by pointing to the 
circumstances under which constitutional change and the convocation of a 
constitutional assembly are likely. In contrast to working groups which, as 
noted above, are appointed for a defined functional purpose and operate in a 
delimited political space on a day-to-day basis, constitutional assemblies will 
be convoked during a period of crisis, when general revisions of societal rules 
are both more desirable and more probable than in normal times. 
Consequently, constitutional assemblies will usually face severe time 
pressures, on the one hand limiting “the range of the possible”, while on the 
other opening a window of opportunity to realise fundamental change in a 
“constitutional moment”.
25 
Formally, working groups and constitutional assemblies have a common 
starting point when it comes to convocation: both are convoked by an external 
authority, since they are not permanent institutions in their own right. 
However, in contrast to a working group, where the hierarchy between the 
convoking and convoked body remains clearly in favour of the former, the 
relation between the convoking and the convoked authorities will be less 
clear-cut in the case of constitutional assemblies. Elster calls this the paradox 
of constitutional assemblies as “[o]n the one hand, it seems to be a general 
principle that if X brings Y into being, then X has an authority superior to that 
                                                           
24 J. ELSTER, supra note 5. 
25 B. ACKERMAN, We The People, Cambridge, MA, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
1991.   12
of Y. On the other hand, if Y is brought into being to regulate, among other 
things the activities of X, Y would seem to be the superior instance”.
26 He 
concludes that in the historic American and French cases the assemblies 
ultimately got the upper hand over their creators, an aspect further developed 
when discussing the criterion of an assembly’s mandate. Thus, a struggle 
about superiority between a convoking and a convoked authority or - in 
political science terms - between the principal and the agent may serve as a 
first criterion to differentiate a constitutional assembly from a working group.
27 
 
2.  Selection of Delegates 
 
The second step - selecting delegates for the novel body - equally 
concerns decisions taken by authorities other than the convoked body itself. 
In the case of constitutional assemblies delegates usually are not selected by 
the authority that has convoked the body, but by other institutions.
28 Working 
group members, on the other hand, may be selected by the convoking 
authority itself (as was the case with the Group of Wise Men) or by each 
convoking member (as is the case with government representatives in IGCs). 
However, not only can the selecting authorities differ between working groups 
and constitutional assemblies, so can (and do) the criteria for selection. 
Whereas working group members are mostly chosen on grounds of expertise 
or seniority, selection criteria for constitutional assemblies are based on 
representativity - also reflected in their more comprehensive membership. 
Delegates to constitutional assemblies are elected either directly for the 
purpose of serving in that body or indirectly by the elected authorities of which 
they are members.
29 Thus, selection on the basis of expertise and/or 
                                                           
26  As the pages in our version of ELSTER’s article are not numbered, precise references cannot be 
given here. 
27  For a discussion of principal-agent theory in relation to the European Union see M.A. POLLACK, The 
Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda-Setting in the EU, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2003. 
28  In France, the Assemblée was convoked by the King whereas the delegates where selected by the 
estates; in the US, the Philadelphia Convention was convoked by the Continental Congress, while its 
members were selected by the single state legislatures. 
29 J. ELSTER, supra note 5; H. DIPPEL, supra note 23.   13
governmental affiliation versus a popular or parliamentary mandate further 





ELSTER’s third step refers to the mandate given to the body as a collective 
as well as to the individual delegates. Additionally, the modes of interpreting 
and implementing these mandates by the body and its delegates will vary. 
Thus, a working group mandate is limited in scope, most of the time restricted 
to finding common ground among the delegated members, to defining 
problems and to tabling options among which decision-makers can choose. 
The mandate of a constitutional assembly, on the contrary, is usually wider by 
definition, covering the reorganisation (or foundation) of a society’s 
constitutional basis.
31 However, ELSTER also notes that mandates given to 
constitutional assemblies are by no means unrestricted, with the creating 
authorities always trying to keep certain institutions or issues out of bounds for 
discussion. Nevertheless, in contrast to working groups, constitutional 
assemblies are not only convoked to settle basic societal conflicts and 
questions, they are also expected to come up with a fully-fledged solution 
rather than with options or recommendations. 
Another decisive difference relates to the internal perception and 
implementation of the external mandate. Whereas there is (supposedly) little 
ambition within a working group to overthrow authority and to “shirk” by taking 
independent decisions, constitutional assemblies may, as ELSTER puts it, very 
well “rebel against the creators and […] the rebel will typically succeed”. 
Hence, the level of ambition and (dis-)obedience vis-à-vis the official mandate 
is a further criterion, as is the interpretation of delegation, with a working 
group likely to remain an agent and a constitutional assembly likely to topple 
this role and to go beyond the will of the principal. 
                                                           
30  For a discussion of representation as a political concept in relation to the Convention see J. POLLAK, 
“The Convention on the Future of Europe: New and Shining?”, EIF Working Paper, 7/2004. 
31 J. HABERMAS, “So, Why Does Europe Need a Constitution?”, EUI Policy Papers on Constitutional 
Reform of the European Union, 2001/02. Available at http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/e-
texts/CR200102UK.pdf.   14
Similarly, delegating institutions will always try to limit their delegates’ 
scope for action. In EU working groups these limitations result from well-
known national negotiation instructions, while less formalised groups are 
bound by (minimum) targets beyond which the delegate cannot go. For 
constitutional assemblies, ELSTER distinguishes three kinds of bound 
mandates: “Instructions about how to vote on specific issues, instructions to 
refuse to debate specific issues, and instructions to withdraw from the 
assembly in case certain decisions are made.” However, similar to potential 
disobedience of the entire body, he observes that formally given mandates 
have limited impact on the individual delegate. Again, the self-confident 
ignoring of given limitations by both assembly and individual delegate seems 
to be constitutive of constitutional assemblies.
32 
 
4. Verifying  Delegates’  Credentials and Formal Constitution 
 
The fourth step in ELSTER’S scheme, the verification of credentials and the 
process of the body’s formal constitution, proposes that in times of crisis and 
fundamental change it is by no means certain that those present in a 
constitutional assembly accept each other as equal and valid counterparts, 
especially where the authorities that convoke and select do not coincide. 
Although contested credentials need not be a defining criterion for 
constitutional assemblies, in a mere working group the delegates’ credentials 
are unlikely to become an issue. With regard to its formal constitution, the 
difference between a working group and a constitutional assembly is mainly 
symbolic. Whereas the formal constitution of a working group is merely a 
necessary step before work can begin, the formal constitution of a 
constitutional assembly is much more directed to the public and is aimed at 
verifying the body’s historical importance and dignity. The degree of 
symbolism used in the act of constitution may thus serve as another criterion 
when defining the nature and institutional quality of the European Convention. 
                                                           
32  See also DIPPEL in this volume, referring to “revolutionary” and “constitutional” conventions. While 
DIPPEL agrees with ELSTER that the Philadelphia Convention overstepped its mandate, he considers 
this an unlawful and inappropriate example for the Convention on the Future of Europe.   15
 
5.  Definition of Procedural Rules 
 
The definition of procedural rules is chosen by ELSTER as a fifth constitutive 
step because procedures “affect the transformation, expression and 
aggregation of preferences that can be crucial for the final outcome”. After 
convocation, a novel body thus has to agree on its decision-rules and working 
procedures, as well as on the internal division of competences. Whereas 
working groups typically rely on externally given rules or informal procedures 
and usually decide by consensus or even unanimity in closed settings, 
constitutional assemblies dispose of more leeway to determine the internal 
organisation of their work, including a decision about when to conclude their 
sittings in relation to external time pressures. Depending on its size the 
assembly might also choose to establish sub-groups and decide how the 
results of these are linked to the plenary. Overall, one would expect a 
constitutional assembly to work according to a parliamentary mode with public 
debates, voting and majority decisions. 
 
6.  Ratification of Results 
 
Finally and perhaps most importantly, the question of how to ratify the 
results has to be settled. In a working group this question clearly lies outside 
that body’s scope and it is entirely up to the convoking authority to decide how 
to handle the results. In a constitutional assembly, on the contrary, the issue 
of ratification is intrinsically linked to the question of superiority. Various 
choices can be made with regard to the procedure that links the assembly’s 
result with its entering into force. The result can either be approved by the 
convoking authority (such as the King in the French case), or by the 
delegating authorities (such as the state legislatures in the US). In principle, 
such a procedure consolidates the superiority of the outside authorities over 
both the constitutional assembly and, ultimately, over the new political and 
legal order. Alternatively, the result can be directly conferred to the sovereign 
by superseding or circumventing any other external authority. This can be 
organised in various ways, e.g. via specifically created ratifying institutions   16
(such as ratifying assemblies, as in the US case) or via constitutional 
referenda. For constitutional arrangements foreseeing various levels of 
governance, the question of how many sub-units have to agree to the final 
outcome also needs to be settled. The decisive issue, however, remains 
whether the assembly subordinates its outcome to a decision (and possible 
re-opening) by the convoking authority or presents its result to the organised 
sovereign as a “take it or leave it” solution. 
  Constitutional Assembly  Working Group 
1. Convocation  - in a perceived crisis 
- by outside authority 
- inherent struggle about 
superiority 
- on a day-to-day basis 




2. Selection of 
delegates 
- by outside authority (II)  
- popular/ parliamentary 
representation 
- by outside authority/ 
component parts 
- governmental representation/ 
technical expertise 
3. Mandate  - fully-fledged solution 
- high level of ambition and 
disobedience to mandate 
(individual & collective) 
- common ground/ options 
- adherence to mandate 
(individual & collective) 
4. Credentials 
& formal  
constitution 
- credentials contested  
- symbolic inauguration 
- credentials unquestioned  




- public deliberations  
- voting/ qualified majority 
- externally given 
- secrecy/ in camera setting 




- “take it or leave it” solution
- direct transfer to the 
organised sovereign  
- further negotiation on the 
results by outside authority 
- no popular involvement   17
 
II.  The European Convention: Towards a Constitutional Assembly? 
 
In the following, the above-established abstract criteria, characterising 
either a working group or a constitutional assembly, will be applied to the 
Convention on the Future of Europe as an empirical test case. In considering 
the political rationale and historical context of the Convention, its function and 
composition as well as the outcome and impact of the Convention process, 
we will explore whether and where precisely the balance tilts towards either 
comparative category, each of which not only indicative of the Convention’s 
quality but also conveying distinct assumptions about the nature of 
constitutional change in Europe and the integration process as such. 
 
A.  Convocation: The Laeken Summit and the Laeken Declaration 
 
Following our above discussion of constitutive criteria, the first of these, 
convocation, boils down to two dimensions: history (are we dealing with a 
“constitutional moment” in times of fundamental crisis or with a distinct reform 
purpose in a delimited political space?) and hierarchy (is the convoking 
authority clearly superior or can we expect struggles about who gains the 
upper hand?). To tackle both points we need to look at, first, the political 
climate prior to and during the 2001 Laeken Summit as the convoking 
moment, and, second, at the Laeken Declaration as the convoking document. 
Despite widespread public and political disillusionment with both the 
outcome and method of the 2000 IGC, the Irish “no” to Nice in June 2001, and 
mounting pressure for large-scale institutional reform prior to EU enlargement, 
little indicated a genuine crisis in Europe at the end of 2001. Although the 
Nice Treaty was widely perceived as sub-optimal
33 few commentators 
suggested that the Union would cease to function when operating under the 
new rules. However, the wording of the Laeken Declaration suggested a 
historical moment in Europe - “the Union stands at a crossroads, a defining 
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moment in its existence”
34 - and it convoked the Convention to provide 
solutions to pressing problems. 
By baptising the body it convoked a “Convention”, the Laeken Declaration 
not only referred to the “Charter Convention” of 1999/2000, indeed considered 
by many as the most immediate example for the Convention on the Future of 
Europe, especially with regard to its composition and working methods.
35 The 
constitutional connotations were obvious, especially with the European 
Parliament demanding prior to Laeken a Convention to prepare and propose 
a European Constitution and the Finnish Prime Minister, PAAVO  LIPPONEN, 
calling for a Convention to launch a European “constitutionalisation 
process”.
36 Additionally, the Laeken Declaration itself evoked historical 
associations by - for the first time ever in a European Council document - 
explicitly using the term “Constitution”.
3738 
Yet, overall, the Laeken text stood in the tradition of “semi-permanent 
Treaty revision”
39 rather than heralded an exercise in nation building similar to 
18th century North America and France or more recent constitution making in 
times of societal crisis. This is particularly evident when looking at the 
Convention’s three main tasks - “better division and definition of 
competences”, “simplification of the Union’s instruments” and “more 
democracy, transparency and efficiency”.
40 While certainly comprehensive, 
these mandates suggested reform and revision rather than constitutional 
foundation, with the EU clearly a pre-existing and delimited political space. 
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With regard to our second indicator - clear-cut hierarchies - the Laeken 
Declaration did not automatically pre-programme a struggle between the 
European Council as convoking authority and the Convention as a convoked 
body. Rather, the Heads of State and Government confidently claimed 
decision-authority: the Convention’s final document, together with the 
outcomes of national debates, were to serve as “the starting point for 
discussions in the Intergovernmental Conference, which will take the ultimate 
decisions”,
41 a formula indicating “tactical hesitation to make the Convention’s 
output the a priori dominant, let alone exclusive, textual basis for the IGC”.
42 
Thus, although the Laeken Declaration called forth potent constitutive 
associations, formally it set up the Convention as a preparatory committee for 
the IGC to follow. 
However, keeping in mind ELSTER’s conclusions about the gradual 
emancipation of constitutional assemblies, the European Council as 
convoking authority appears to have been all too well aware of possible 
superiority struggles. While only one of the Declaration’s many reform 
questions (indirectly) tackled the role of the European Council itself, many 
safeguards were included to underline governmental authority. By limiting the 
length of proceedings, demanding regular reports from the directly appointed 
President and downgrading the Convention’s result to a mere “starting point”, 
the European Council clearly hoped to pre-empt possible attempts to 
overthrow existing hierarchies.
43 The Convention thus found itself facing the 
dilemma of many a classic constitutional assembly - making a decision as to 
whether to serve its assigned purpose or to rebel against its creator. 
 
B.  Selection of Delegates and the Convention’s Composition 
 
Unlike the step considered in the previous section, the selection of the 
Convention’s delegates much more openly reflected the goal of moving 
beyond the well-known intergovernmental mode of Treaty change, by 
broadening involvement in the process. Taking up our categories, the central 
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criteria to consider with regard to selection and composition are the 
Convention’s size and, more importantly, the question of whether delegates 
were selected on the basis of technical expertise and governmental affiliation 
or, rather, according to popular or parliamentary representation. 
Compared to previous preparatory groups and committees, the principles 
for selection laid down in the Laeken Declaration clearly aimed to extend the 
Convention’s legitimacy basis. Following the formula of the Charter 
Convention, the Heads of State and Government, first and foremost, decided 
to dramatically increase the parliamentary dimension, both national and 
European. Thus, about two thirds of full members had parliamentary origins, 
leaving the government and supranational representatives in a clear 
minority.
44 The European Parliamentarians played a particularly prominent 
role due to their Brussels experience and resources.
45 A broader basis also 
resulted from the Convention’s sheer size: together with the alternates for 
each full conventionnel, the Chairman, the two Vice Chairmen and observers, 
the Convention amassed more than 200 delegates, outnumbering 
Philadelphia by far, bigger than many national Parliaments and certainly on a 
different scale from any working group.
46 
However, it would be highly misleading to consider only the “parliamentary 
plenary”. The composition of the Convention’s influential Presidium reflected 
an entirely different logic. Here, once again, governments tried to reign in the 
Convention’s ambitions by setting up a rather large steering body, where 
compared to the plenary governmental delegates where over-represented. 
Furthermore, and in contrast to the overall selection pattern, both the 
President and the Vice Chairmen were directly appointed by the convoking 
authority, a procedure reminiscent of how working group members have 
traditionally been selected. 
Besides, it is not only the selection of delegates and a body’s composition 
that matter, but also who is pulling strings in the background. Thus, despite 
the initially free and open mandate granted to Convention delegates by 
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parliaments, governments and other delegating authorities, representativity 
did not entirely trump either the role of expertise or the bound mandates 
characteristic of a working group. A key instance of the relevance of expertise 
is the Convention Secretariat, bringing together staff from the Council, 
Commission and European Parliament - many of them veterans of the IGC 
ancien régime - with the experienced British diplomat and negotiator JOHN 
KERR at their head. The Secretariat played a powerful role in the Convention 
process, able to draw on experience and knowledge accumulated in previous 
rounds of reform. Also, all but one of the Convention’s internal working groups 
employed expert hearings, with the groups working on subsidiarity, the 
Charter, legal personality and simplification all calling MICHEL  PETITE and 
JEAN-CLAUDE PIRIS, Director Generals of the Commission’s and Council’s legal 
services, and moreover both IGC veterans.
47 The importance of expertise on 
the one hand and governmental control on the other continued well into the 
Convention’s decision-process (indeed, the nearer the hand-over to the IGC, 
the more important became governmental representatives and influence) and 
into the follow-up (where the “Piris Group” of legal experts worked on the Draft 
Treaty both prior to and during the IGC). 
Overall, even though the plenary was numerically dominated by 
parliamentarians, the Convention’s composition followed a logic of institutional 
representation, aiming to reflect a broad spectrum of views and expertise. 
Whereas the main goal of ensuring open discussion and deliberation echoes 
previous preparatory committees, the strategy of ensuring an inclusive debate 
through broad membership (albeit by no means exactly representative of 
citizens, parties or gender) was clearly novel and supports those that consider 
the Convention method to be a genuinely new reform mode.
48 
 
C.  The Convention’s Formal Mandate and Its Interpretation 
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If the selection of delegates and the Convention’s composition tilts the 
balance of analysis towards a constitutional assembly, the mandate granted 
by the European Council at Laeken suggests a different reading. When 
defining our set of criteria in part 2, we concluded that next to the formal 
mandate given to both the aggregate body and its individual members (free 
and fundamental in the case of a constitutional assembly, bound and 
functional in a working group), the interpretation and implementation of that 
mandate is crucial to the high degree of self-confidence and disobedience 
indicative of a fully-fledged constitutional assembly. 
This last point is particularly relevant in the Convention case, as the Laeken 
mandate was relatively vague in its procedural-institutional instructions, and 
this imprecision reflected a plurality of substantive positions and divergent 
conceptualisations of the integration process and the Convention’s role 
therein. Nonetheless, despite the Declaration’s 61 heterogeneous questions, 
from a formal point of view the mandate came across as functional, albeit 
fairly open-ended, for the aggregate body and the individual delegate: the 
Convention was called to “pave the way for the next Intergovernmental 
Conference as broadly and openly as possible” and to present “different 
options” or “recommendations if consensus is achieved”.
49 
At the same time, the three main tasks touched upon in section 3.1, albeit 
comprehensive, smack of reorganisation and reform rather than the creation 
of a novel legal order and “symbolic depth”
50 - a point underlined by frequent 
references to the Union’s Treaties as the basis and object of discussion. 
Taken together with the traditional role of the IGC as ultimate decision-
authority, the mandate thus suggested a functional rationale, similar to that 
underlying previous preparatory groups and committees, established in order 
to efficiently set an agenda by means of open discussions and to facilitate 
intergovernmental bargaining through pre-negotiation. Politically, on the other 
hand, the Convention formula was intended to meet public criticism of the IGC 
method without abolishing IGCs themselves - an aspect cleverly 
instrumentalised by the Convention itself so as to bolster its position and 
authority. 
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To an extent, however, the Laeken mandate can also be read as an 
authorisation to fundamentally reform the (developing) European polity - 
reorganising competences, simplifying the Union’s instruments and tackling 
issues of democracy, transparency and efficiency. Even the Union’s value 
basis and fundamental rights were on the agenda - all in all a mandate that 
left scope, not only to think “out of the box”
51 but indeed to fundamentally 
transform the EU’s constitutional basis.
52 The explicit mentioning of a 
European Constitution as possible (long run) outcome, as well as the 
possibility of changing amendment and ratification procedures equally 
underlined that there was no furthest limit to the Convention’s discursive 
scope in terms of the subjects it might tackle or the conclusions it might reach. 
This factor is similarly apparent when we consider the relative discretion 
enjoyed by most delegates vis-à-vis their principals.
53 
Looking to the second criterion - self-confidence and disobedience - a 
paradoxical situation is observed, with the Convention process ricocheting 
between free preparation and bound decision-making. On the one hand, the 
Convention not only took up the challenge of tackling most of the Laeken 
questions, it also dealt with issues not directly asked - or indeed avoided - in 
Laeken, such as financial aspects or the role of the European Council. Apart 
from this content-related “breaking free”, a power struggle between the 
creator and its creation emerged in the terrain of internal organisation. 
Whereas GISCARD was able to shift the foreseen starting date of the 
Convention, debates about when to conclude its work and about the time 
lapse between the Convention and the following IGC continued throughout 
the Convention process, intensifying in the spring and early summer of 
2003.
54 Eventually, the Convention managed to extend its mandate by half a 
year and successfully pressed for a final session even after the first part of the 
Constitutional Treaty had been handed over to the European Council in 
Thessaloniki on 19 and 20 June 2003. 
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On the other hand, for these changes the Convention had to “ask 
permission” from the European Council as its principal. Even more 
astonishing, the more certain the Convention became that it would present to 
the Heads of State and Government not a schedule of options but rather a 
single legal document (thus confidently over-reaching a working group 
mandate), the more the IGC as the ultimate authority cast its shadow over the 
preliminary decision-process and restricted the range of the possible (with the 
Convention thus implicitly acknowledging its role as a subordinate agent). 
GISCARD in particular was certainly influenced by anticipating his former 
colleagues’ maximum levels of tolerance and acceptance
55 (cf. Göler/Marhold 
2003, 321) - a classic behavioural pattern according to principal-agent theory 
(cf. Pollack 2003). At the same time, it was GISCARD who insisted right from 
the very beginning that the Convention could only succeed if it delivered a 
consensus-based single document that the IGC would find it difficult to amend 
(cf. Giscard 2002). His call in the opening speech for a single text labelled a 
“Constitution” not only triggered the first spontaneous applause in the 
Convention plenary (cf. Norman 2003, 47) but became the (symbolic and 
practical) cornerstone of the entire process. 
In sum, any analysis of the Convention’s mandate and how it was 
interpreted by that body, its President and delegates will be ambivalent. 
While, first of all, functional in tone, the mandate also lent itself to a wider and 
more symbolic interpretation and was stretched to the utmost limits by the 
Convention, which, however, never formally challenged the European 
Council’s superiority. 
 
D. Verifying  Delegates’  Credentials and Formal Constitution 
 
Symbolism rather than legal basis plays an important role in the fourth step 
of Elster’s categorisation, namely the question of formal constitution and the 
verification of the delegates’ credentials. A working group is likely to remain a 
much more “secular” and “sober” affair, while a constitutional assembly will 
pay tribute to the task of transforming a community’s most basic rules. The 
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dignity of the constitutional process will be further underlined by questioning 
and debating the delegates’ credentials, whereas these are usually taken for 
granted in preparatory groups. 
The Convention’s opening ceremony clearly reflected an ambition to 
celebrate high symbolism. Not only the European Council President but also 
the Presidents of the European Parliament and Commission gave speeches 
to the packed Brussels hemicycle, emphasising the important task and 
historic burden of the process ahead.
56 Mixing emotion and pathos, VALÉRY 
GISCARD D’ESTAING strongly underlined that his task was not to lead a mere 
preparatory group. Careful, however, not to refer to Philadelphia - as he had 
regularly done in the preceding months - he stressed the importance of 
Europe’s global role, and painted the consequences of the Convention’s 
failure in bleak colours: “[…] each country would return to the free trade 
system. None of us - not even the largest of us - would have the power to take 
on the giants of the world. We would then remain locked in on ourselves, 
grimly analysing the causes of our decline and fall”.
57 
However, while it is easy to concede that the Convention’s official opening 
and President Giscard’s speech in particular created a mood of symbolic 
moment - albeit less so than did the closing ceremony - public awareness did 
not follow suit and two months after the Convention’s launch only 28% of 
citizens interviewed in an official poll claimed to have heard of the process.
58 
Chances of creating greater visibility and awareness may have been lost at 
the beginning with the choice of Brussels as a permanent working seat rather 
than rotation among national capitals, and with the adoption of consensus as 
decision-mode, rather than more media-attracting vote procedures, as will be 
discussed below. 
When it comes to the verification of delegates’ credentials the picture is 
similarly mixed. Prior to the Convention’s start, controversy flourished about 
Giscard’s intergovernmental leanings and his age,
59 about the purely 
intergovernmental selection of the Convention’s President and Vice 
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Presidents as well as about the Presidium’s composition. Additional debates 
arouse about who was to chair the Convention’s internal working groups. 
Nevertheless, most delegates were appointed without major discussions, and 
few nominations initially attracted public attention. An interesting exception, 
with regard to delegates’ credentials, equality and mutual recognition, was the 
situation of members from the then candidate countries. For the first time 
invited to fully participate in reforming the Union they were about to enter, they 
did not enjoy completely equal status with the “EU insiders”. The Laeken 
Declaration not only precluded them from preventing “any consensus which 
may emerge among the Member States”,
60 they were also denied equal rights 
with regard to the use of their own language and - notably - membership in 
the Presidium. After initial irritation, however, their status was upgraded: Alois 
Peterle was invited into the Presidium as a permanent observer, and 
interpreters could be brought to the plenaries, allowing representatives of the 
accession countries to speak in their mother tongues.
61 In practice the 
limitation with regard to the final decision did not matter, as there was no 
formal voting in the Convention and the Draft Constitution was accepted by 
broad consensus. 
In view of ELSTER’s fourth step, the combined elements of the official 
opening and struggles about delegates’ credentials and equality - especially 
regarding  conventionnels from the applicant countries - thus support 
identification of the Convention as a constitutional assembly. 
 
E.  Defining Rules of Procedure and Decision-Making 
 
As mentioned in section 2, rules of procedure and of decision-making in 
particular are vital for the process of expressing and aggregating preferences, 
and thus both implicitly and explicitly contribute to shaping final outcomes. 
Among various factors - internal organisation, the openness of proceedings or 
decision-rules themselves - in the preceding we singled out three as indicative 
of either working groups or constitutional assemblies: external versus internal 
determination of rules, secrecy versus openness and consensus versus 
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voting. Before looking to the types of working methods and decision-
processes followed in the Convention, any analysis thus needs to assess how 
free it was with regard to self-institutionalisation. 
The Laeken Declaration laid down consensus as the principle decision-rule 
and pre-determined the strong role of the Presidium,
62 but overall it was 
vague with regard to both the internal organisation of the Convention’s work 
and its decision-rules, leaving the body ample leeway to determine its own 
working methods. Heated controversies about these demonstrated how 
seriously the issue was understood by both Chairman and Convention 
members. Having set up the Secretariat, Giscard immediately embarked on 
preparing the rules of procedure with a first draft presented even before the 
Convention had started work. This draft met with fierce criticism from 
conventionnels, with the parliamentarians in particular feeling that the 
proposals would allow the Chairman and Presidium too much autonomy vis-à-
vis the plenary.
63 After more than 340 amendments and the discussion of a 
revised draft, the rules were changed again, to be finally accepted without 
formal vote in the guise of the so-called “Note on Working Methods”.
64 
In its rules of procedure, the Convention adopted a “parliamentary 
approach”: debate took place in public and all documents were accessible via 
the Convention website.
65 Additionally, compared to Giscard’s draft, the rights 
of the plenary were extended with regard to amending the agenda or setting 
up working groups, and the status of alternates was upgraded. Overall, this 
openness and transparency thus clearly broke - at least in principle - with the 
much bemoaned secrecy of IGC negotiations and instead reminded of the 
way the Charter Convention proceeded. The institutionalisation of working 
groups in the second phase further contributed to relatively free and un-
prejudiced debates on delicate matters such as the Union’s legal personality, 
the simplification of instruments and the reorganisation of competences.
66 
Furthermore, the relatively open written rules left room for unwritten rules to 
emerge, e.g. the famous introduction of blue cards to facilitate debate and the 
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progressive equalisation of full members, alternates and observers. In the first 
two relatively uncontroversial phases of the Convention, these arrangements 
contributed to creating the “esprit de corps” that GISCARD had aspired to in his 
opening speech. 
Both the degree and the type of institutionalisation in the Convention are 
thus a-typical of working groups, which rely much more on informal and 
handed-down working modes and certainly do not debate rules of procedure 
in a similarly extensive manner. A good case in point is the above-mentioned 
“Group of Government Representatives”, traditionally pre-negotiating Treaty 
change, and relying exclusively on informal rules of procedure, in addition to 
the scarce provisions of Art. 48 TEU. Equally, working groups normally 
proceed in small-scale, in camera settings which would certainly not have 
fulfilled the Convention’s requirements of openness and transparency, 
although arguably secrecy may favour open exchange, in-depth discussions 
and deliberation more than public settings and publicity.
67 
However, when considering the Convention, it would be easy to 
underestimate the influence of decisions about personnel, on the one hand, 
and decisions about day-to-day proceedings, on the other. Indeed, the crucial 
decision about who would serve as Chairman and Vice Presidents was 
externally imposed by Laeken (with the Convention nevertheless free to 
choose the other members of the Presidium). Similarly, while the working 
group or IGC style of proceeding may have been abolished en grand, criticism 
of the Presidium’s and working groups’ closed meetings, the non-accessibility 
of Presidium minutes, and observations about the influence of the Convention 
Secretariat show that these more traditional organs may have continued to 
dominate on a daily basis, indeed even more than is usually assumed. 
Furthermore, the choice of consensus as decision-mode also points to a 
persistence of working group procedures. The - very particular - definition of 
consensus in the European Convention was modelled on the Charter 
Convention, where it was for the President to judge when a consensus had 
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emerged among the different component parts.
68 In a similar vein, from the 
beginning GISCARD insisted that the Convention should not vote but rely on 
consensus only, with the rules of procedure reserving to the Chairman and 
the Presidium the discretionary power to identify consensus. This choice - 
seemingly underlining the importance of deliberation, open exchange and the 
need for agreement - is problematic for a body supposedly adopting the 
model or ambitions of a constitutional assembly. First, consensus has been a-
typical in processes of national constitution making where voting is the 
general rule.
69 At the same time, the possibility of voting is more than a 
decision-rule, also standing for a minority’s willingness to adhere to the 
majority’s decision, a pre-condition considered lacking at the supranational 
level and often problematised when discussing the appropriate democratic 
regime for the EU.
70 Second, and related to the question of public awareness, 
the choice of consensus was a double-edged sword when it came to media-
attention: on the one hand the Convention only stood a chance of influencing 
the IGC if it submitted a document backed by consensus, on the other, “the 
interest of the media would be fairly limited even if it did reach consensus, 
since there would be no great conflict to report about”.
71 
Once more, the balance seems mixed: officially and in its plenary meetings, 
the Convention adopted a parliamentary approach, clearly breaking with the 
“IGC tradition“, while relics of the much-criticised method of preparing 
intergovernmental summits seem to have lived on in the Presidium’s working 
modes, in the opaque formula of broad consensus and in continuing 
subordination to the European Council’s verdict when deciding on the 
sensitive issue of timing. 
 
F.  The Convention’s Output and Ratification of the Constitutional  
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As a final - and crucial - criterion to assess the Convention’s nature, we 
need to consider its results and the process of ratification, paying particular 
attention to the quality of the outcome in view of the mandate, the relationship 
between the Convention and the subsequent IGC and the ratification and 
amendment procedures for the newly established Constitutional Treaty. Three 
questions will be of particular interest: first, did the Convention draft a fully-
fledged document or make recommendations only?, second, was there much 
re-opening and further negotiation?, and third, in how far will citizens be 
involved? 
It has been argued already that by finding a broad consensus on a single 
text - the “Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe” - the 
Convention exploited its mandate to the full. Early rejecting a low profile 
approach, the Convention was determined to avoid the fate of previous 
preparatory groups and committees, the “Reflection Group” prior to 
Amsterdam being a good example of high-quality debates and comprehensive 
suggestions that had very little impact on the subsequent IGC. Adopting an 
approach similar to the Charter Convention - preparing a fait accompli legal 
document - the Convention delivered a fully-fledged constitutional text that 
could have been ratified as it stood. This achievement of giving one answer to 
the 61 Laeken questions was celebrated in the Convention’s final session with 
the playing of the European anthem and the solemn signature of the 
Constitutional Treaty by all conventionnels and was underlined by President 
GISCARD in asking the Heads of State and Government to rubberstamp the 
text without further changes.
72 And although, as is well-known, this is not what 
happened, it is notable that the European Council in Thessaloniki similarly 
emphasised the link between the Convention’s output, the European 
Parliament and the European people when it called on the IGC to “complete 
its work and agree the Constitutional Treaty as soon as possible and in time 
for it to become known to European citizens before the June 2004 elections 
for the European Parliament”.
73 
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In terms of content, the Convention was indeed able to provide solutions to 
fundamental constitutional questions, left unresolved by previous IGCs. The 
Constitutional Treaty has been amply discussed and we will not go into detail 
here. However, we note that the introduction of a single legal personality and 
the abolition of the pillar structure, the clearer categorisation of competences, 
the role of national Parliaments in the new procedure to control subsidiarity, 
the simplification of the Union’s instruments, the inclusion of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and, not least, innovations in the EU’s institutional set-up 
such as the permanent European Council President and the European 
Foreign Minister all contribute to a comprehensive constitutional overhaul of 
the existing system without,  admittedly, creating a genuinely novel order. 
Having proposed a legal basis “[r]eflecting the will of the citizens and States of 
Europe” (Art. I-1) the European Convention’s output could thus well qualify as 
that of a constitutional assembly.
74 
At the same time, notwithstanding, from a substantive point of view, it is 
also possible to argue that the Constitutional Treaty in its present form has 
been shaped more by gradual constitutionalisation through the European 
Court of Justice, by incremental reform by IGCs and by the day-to-day policy-
making of the Union than by the European Convention. Indeed, the latter 
engaged more in a “tidying up” of existing provisions than in creating a 
Constitution as envisaged before the process started– short, clear and 
accessible to the European citizen. Equally, the Convention hardly brought 
the evolutionary trend of European constitutionalism to an historic halt - there 
are numerous provisions for continuing constitutionalisation, such as those 
concerning the future size of the Commission (Art. I-26) or the simplified 
revision procedure (Art. IV-444). Furthermore, it was exactly those issues 
deemed most constitutional, and most political, that were re-opened by the 
Heads of State and Government at the 2003/2004 IGC, accompanied by 
power-struggles echoing Nice and leading to the (temporary) break-down of 
the negotiations in December 2003. 
More than the Convention’s substantive results, however, the methods by 
which the Draft Treaty has been dealt with in procedural terms recall previous 
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committees and working groups. It is true that the much-feared “firewall” of 
several months between the end of the Convention and the beginning of the 
IGC did not occur, nor was the IGC conducted according to the classic three-
level negotiation model, with, instead, the political level strengthened and the 
Foreign Ministers playing an unprecedented role. Furthermore, the major part 
of the Constitutional Treaty as well as its basic structure was passed by the 
IGC unchanged. And yet, the Convention never fully stepped out of its role as 
an agent of the Heads of State and Government. The IGC cast its shadow 
over the negotiations in the Convention already and limited the range of the 
possible - a good example being the discussions about majority voting in 
foreign policy. Moreover, as mentioned above, the Heads of State and 
Government re-opened exactly the draft provisions on the most constitutional 
points - those relating to Europe’s institutional set-up as well as the vertical 
and horizontal distribution of powers, such as the number of Commissioners, 
the distinction between a legislative and an executive Council, the extension 
of majority voting, and the weighting of votes in the Council of Ministers. 
Most importantly, the Convention never questioned the ultimate decision-
power of the European Council as convoking authority, despite Giscard calling 
upon the IGC not to re-open the document. Intergovernmental negotiations 
followed and concluded the Convention’s work, and the Constitutional Treaty, 
signed on 29 October 2004, will be ratified according to the established 
procedure, Art. 48 of the existing Treaty on European Union. The Convention 
did not directly link up to the European people for ratification - which would 
have by-passed the Member States as “Masters of the Treaties” - and indeed 
left it to the European Parliament and some governments to raise the question 
of referenda. While more countries than usual (although by no means all) 
have decided to ratify by referendum, or to at least hold consultative 
plebscites, proposals for a Europe-wide referendum were never seriously 
considered. Based on an act of will of the states rather than the people of 
Europe,
75 the mode of ratification thus serves as another indicator for the 
Convention process as one of reforming Treaties rather than of changing, let 
alone creating, a Constitution. 
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The above analysis set out to draw systematic conclusions about the 
Convention’s nature as well as its embedding in (or breaking with) previous 
processes and methods of EU reform. By introducing two heuristic categories 
- working group and constitutional assembly - each defined by six qualifying 
criteria, we attempted to free the analysis from straightforward comparisons, 
while nevertheless drawing on historical associations, institutional and 
functional characteristics, normative expectations, as well as the various 
public, political and academic discourses on the two concepts. In light of our 
criteria, based on JON  ELSTER’s six constitutive steps, the balance of the 
analysis is genuinely mixed: the European Convention was neither a second 
Philadelphia nor a second Reflection Group, it decidedly broke with some 
features of the much-criticised IGC method while preserving others, and it 
stretched a vague mandate to its limits while never fully overstepping the 
bounds of its designated role as an agent of the European Council. 
As shown in the empirical analysis, several arguments support a reading of 
the Convention as a constitutional assembly, decidedly breaking with past 
reforms. Despite several attempts to broaden debate in preparatory 
committees, the agenda-setting and pre-negotiation stages of previous reform 
rounds had been characterised by functional mandates, clear-cut principle-
agent relations and un-transparent negotiations. In contrast, the Convention’s 
membership was significantly broader, and its parliamentary composition and 
working methods constituted a qualitative leap forward, both in terms of 
representativity and transparency. Similarly, the decentralised selection of 
delegates and the Convention’s self-confident interpretation of a wide, yet 
predominantly functional mandate recall the conduct of a constitutional 
assembly rather than a classic working group or preparatory committee. 
Clever use of symbolism underlined the historic significance of the process 
from inauguration to closure, which, together with the Convention’s policy of 
adopting a single legal document - introducing major changes in Europe’s 
institutional set-up as well as the horizontal and vertical distribution of   34
competences - sets the Convention apart from previous modes of preparing 
and negotiating Europe’s evolving Treaty base. 
On the other hand, the Draft Constitutional Treaty as backed by consensus 
in the Convention was not simply rubberstamped by the Heads of State and 
Government, but was partially re-opened and fiercely re-negotiated. Albeit 
conducted along different lines from previous reform rounds, the 2003/2004 
IGC ultimately underlined and affirmed the European Council’s unquestioned 
authority. Similarly, when deciding on the procedure for the new Treaty’s 
ratification no attempt was made to modify the fundamentally 
intergovernmental nature of this significant formality by, e.g., introducing 
majority provisions or establishing different ratification modes for different 
parts of the Treaty. In addition, the IGC ancien régime was assimilated into 
the Convention process in terms of both personnel and procedure, as seen in 
the strong role of Presidium and Secretariat, the opaque consensus rule, and 
the replacement of Convention members in the final negotiation phase by 
senior representatives so as to increase governmental weight and power. 
In terms of both substance and procedure the Convention thus continued 
rather than broke with Europe’s long-term, idiosyncratic reform process: 
evolutionary constitution building, mostly - yet not exclusively - controlled by 
governments and without a clear-cut finalité. Joining elements of Treaty 
change and national constitution making, mixing the intergovernmental, 
supranational and parliamentary, and defying international as well as state 
analogies, the Convention has itself become the epitome of conflicting views 
about the ontology of integration and the most appropriate route for (future) 
European reform. The multi-facetted Convention process combined with a 
trimmed down IGC may not have been the most effective, democratic or 
legitimate way of reform, nor does that choice of method indicate clear 
conclusions about the ultimate object of change (or vice versa) - yet, mirroring 
Europe’s sui generis polity, only a similarly mixed mode may have proven 
viable. In this sense, the “final product” bears a telling name: after ratification 
Europe’s set of foundational rules and institutions will be a “Treaty 
Establishing a Constitution for Europe”. 
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